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A DEMAND-BASED MODEL FOR THE ADVANCED AND SPOT PRICING OF SERVICES 
 
Abstract 
 This paper models the probability of non-consumption of a service by advance buyers as 
well as the re-selling of the relinquished capacity, and investigates its effect on the pricing of 
advance and spot demand of services. The model shows that advance prices are always lower than 
spot prices, since advance buyers provide for higher potential revenue due to the non-consumption 
effect. Another significant finding of the model would be the conditions under which market 
failure occurs i.e. when the firm does not sell in advance nor at consumption time. It is also 
extended to show that providing a refund to advance buyers, as insurance against non-
consumption, may be profitable.  
Key words: Services, Advance Selling, Revenue Management, Refund, Pricing 
INTRODUCTION 
 The service sector now accounts for about 70% of aggregate production and employment 
in developed economies. However, many who have attempted to study the service industry have 
lamented on its diversity, for within the service economy lie a heterogeneous set of activities that 
include financial services, telecommunication, retail, transportation, entertainment, education, and 
also not-for-profit activities.  Adding to the complexity of pricing is the fact that many services are 
bundled with goods, or may be a facilitating service between two or more services and/or goods 
e.g. a mobile payment service. 
 This paper aims to provide a theoretical insight into the demand behavior and the advance 
pricing of services, specifically those with high fixed costs, low variable costs and short-term 
capacity constraints, and that can be purchased in advance, such as hotels and airlines. It begins 
with the argument of why advance demand and spot demand would exist from a behavioral 
standpoint i.e. that the former consist of buyers who want certainty in availability of a service and 
the latter consist of buyers who want certainty in consumption. The paper also introduces the 
probability of advance buyers not being able to use the service at consumption time, and how the 
relinquished capacity can be re-sold. The study then proceeds to model the concepts. Unlike 
previous studies, this model captures consumers as heterogeneous through the use of demand 
functions, and also explicitly considers price sensitivity within each time period, as well as cross-
time sensitivity.  
 The results show that advance prices are always lower than spot (consumption time) prices. 
This is because advance purchases are expected to contribute higher potential revenue, as a result 
of the non-consumption effect. This finding is significant, as no previous model has captured the 
non-consumption effect of services, and the model shows its impact on advance and spot prices 
and quantities. When the firm is constrained by capacity, the results show that it may not wish to 
sell in advance, since a service that is highly state-dependent leads to a price too low to sell in 
advance and thus the firm would prefer to sell at spot. This is consistent with Png (1989).  
 The study goes on to show the conditions of market failure; when prices are too low for the 
firm to sell in advance and too high for buyers to buy at spot. The model is then extended to show 
that providing a refund to advance buyers as insurance for non-consumption may result in higher 
profit. While previous models have shown that a refund may be optimal due to an increase in the 
price obtained from the offer, this study shows that the insurance may also be funded by an 
expanded advance demand and higher spot prices. Previous advance selling models have not fully 
integrated prices, quantities, heterogeneous demand functions and price/cross-time sensitivities and 
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the non-consumption effect. This paper also aims to provide a more realistic characterization of 
advance selling. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §1, a review of literature is presented, 
highlighting the behavioral issues in advanced and spot demand. In §2, a theoretical model 
formulation is presented. The model is then extended to incorporate a refund offer in §3. In §4, 
asymmetric demand functions are considered.   Discussion of the results follows in §5, together 
with managerial implications. The paper then concludes with some remarks and directions for 
future research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The importance of price has led researchers to describe price as the most flexible of the 
marketing mix, with relatively quick implementation characteristics compared to the other factors. 
As such, price is argued to be an important and powerful tool in businesses (Garda, 1991, Shipley 
and Jobber, 1981). More important, price is also known to be the only element in the marketing 
mix that generates revenue, whereas other components are associated with costs. Despite this 
importance however, price is still regarded as the most neglected area in marketing research 
compared to the other elements of the marketing mix (Nagle and Holden, 1995). One particular 
area of pricing research that is lacking considerably is the pricing of services (Schlissel and Chasin, 
1991, Mitra and Capella, 1997).  
 Ng (2008) explains the lack of pricing research in services. She discusses the theoretical 
nature of services (perishability, intangibility and inseparability) as having key impact on pricing, 
and argues for a different treatment on how services should be fundamentally priced. Industry 
reports have supported this, with some claiming that “some of the new service industries may have 
special economic properties that do not fit well with the assumptions of conventional economic 
models.”[1]
 Pricing researchers often research service pricing within the context of services (Danaher, 
2002, Essegaier et al., 2002, Dawes, 2004, Nunn and Sarvary, 2004), rather than trying to 
understand it conceptually. While some have attempted to adopt a more general approach to offer 
insights on common pricing practices and applications across  industries (e.g. Guiltinan, 1987, 
Gotlieb, 1989, Schlissel and Chasin, 1991, Ansari et al., 1996, Tung et al., 1997, Bolton and 
Myers, 2003, Hu et al., 2006, Avlonitis and Indounas, 2006), what is missing is a theoretical 
abstraction of service pricing that could provide knowledge across service industries so that one 
industry (e.g. airline) could learn from another (e.g. banking).  
 One implicit theoretical abstraction that has been reasonably well developed is the 
perishability of service at production/consumption resulting in the need to sell services in advance, 
for example, the case of flights and hotel rooms. This has led to a proliferation of research and 
practice in the field of revenue management (RM), advising optimal prices and capacity allocations 
for the firm before the point of perishability. RM is a collection of tools that makes up the practice 
of revenue management including inventory controls and allocation, and demand forecasting. RM 
practices are now applied to other service firms that face similar constraints as the airlines, such as 
perishable inventory, limited capacity and high fixed costs (Yeomen et al., 1999; Kimes, 1989, 
2003). There is clearly an undeniable relationship between RM practices and the price function, 
and RM researchers have also begun to investigate consumer behavior (Kimes and Thompson, 
2004, Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004, Kimes and Wirtz, 2003) and the dynamic pricing for services 
(Zhao and Zheng, 2000; see Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) for a comprehensive review). 
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However, RM research, often conducted by the OR (operations research) community generally 
assumes advanced demand to be probabilistic in nature. 
 Marketing researchers, in contrast to OR researchers, looked towards capturing primitive 
notions of advance demand behavior. Png (1989), for example, showed that costless reservations in 
advance is a profitable pricing strategy, as it induces truth revelation on the type of valuation that 
the consumer has for the service (which is private information). If the consumer has a high 
valuation i.e. ability to consume, s/he will exercise the reservation and pay a higher price. 
Otherwise, the consumer will not exercise. In another paper, Png (1991) weighed the strategy of 
charging a lower price for advance sales and attaching a price premium at consumption date, 
against one of charging a premium at advanced sale and promising a refund should consumption 
prices be lower than what was originally paid. Shugan and Xie (2000), on the other hand showed 
that advance selling is a marketing tool that does not need industry-specific characteristics but only 
requires the existence of buyer uncertainty about future valuations. Xie and Shugan (2001) then 
proposed when and how to advance sell in a variety of situations, including situations with limited 
capacity, second-period arrivals, refunds, buyer risk aversion, exogenous credibility, continuous 
preference distributions, and premium pricing. Lee and Ng (2001) described advance demand and 
suggested that it is optimal for firms to sell in advance.  
 Closely related is the economics literature on inter-temporal price discrimination, where 
buyers buy at different times and are charged different prices. Literature in this area suggests 
various reasons why such practices may exist. Lott and Roberts (1991) proposed that the higher 
price for late buyers include the opportunity costs of seats being perished. Gale (1993) argued that 
the difference between advanced and spot prices exists because buyers may be homogenous in 
advance and learn their preferences at spot, rendering the product to be differentiated at that time, 
thus allowing the firm to price discriminate. Dana (1998) showed that low and high-valuation 
customers could be separated if the cost of capacity is high, and where demand is uncertain. 
 Perhaps the most integrative work that brings together the above literature in economics, 
operations research and marketing is the work of Ng (2007, 2008), who described the advanced 
demand as a manifestation of behavioral risks. She proposed that buyers at the point of purchase 
trade-off between valuation risk (the risk of not valuing the service at the same level as at 
consumption if s/he buys too early) and acquisition risk (the risk of not being able to acquire the 
service if s/he buys too late). Given this trade-off, Ng argued that a market would exist for selling 
the service far in advance to buyers looking to ensure the availability of the service. Similarly, 
there would also be a market for selling at (close to) consumption time for buyers who would like 
to ensure that they are able to consume. This means that the distribution of demand across the 
selling period of the service becomes important in the firm’s pricing decision. In addition, Ng 
proposed that advance buyers could relinquish their purchase (e.g. no-shows), thus allowing the 
firm to re-sell at consumption time.  
 The implications on the pricing decision are significant. Depending on the demand 
distribution across time, the level of non-consumption and capacity, firms might be prepared to 
manipulate advance and spot prices to optimize profits. This paper endeavors to formulate Ng’s 
propositions mathematically, modeling demand behavior across two time frames – in advance and 
at the time of consumption. In modeling this phenomenon, it is important to highlight three 
primary differences between this study and previous ones. First, this investigation models the 
consumers as heterogeneous, through the use of demand functions. By modeling the consumers’ 
price sensitivity, both the decision of buyers to buy or not to buy as well as the quantities of each 
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choice at a given price are captured in the demand function. Second, the investigation also models 
the substitutability between advance and spot demand, capturing the buyers’ aggregate switching 
decisions as well as the quantities that will switch for a change in price. Finally, the model 
explicitly captures the probability of advance buyers who are not able to consume at the time of 
consumption, and how this impacts on pricing. Through this model, it is hoped that there will be 
greater applicability in the characterization of the phenomenon.  
 All proofs of propositions are found in the appendix. 
MODEL 
The model will now be specified. The following is defined: 
PA, (P0) =  Price per unit of the service sold at advance time (spot) 
π = Profit to the service firm 
qA (q0) = Quantity of service demanded by the market at advance time (spot) 
K = Capacity of the service firm and 0>K  and At ( 0t ) = Advance (spot) time   
 A service sold in advance and at the time of consumption is not unlike two firms selling 
products differentiated only by the time of sale. The difference is that since there is only one 
service firm, the maximized profit is derived from demand at both times. Consequently, we can 
adapt product differentiation models derived from economics literature.  Following Dixit (1979) 
and Singh and Vives (1984), we assume the following demand structure for selling the service at 
At  and 0t : 
APPq δβα +−= 00  and 0PPq AA δβα +−=  where 0>β , 0>δ  and δβ >  
 Forms of this demand curve have been used in marketing modeling literature e.g. McGuire 
and Staelin (1983) who modeled the decision of two manufacturers and their choice to 
intermediate when the demand faced by both are represented by linear demand functions similar to 
that modeled above; and Ingene and Parry (1995) who modeled two competing retailers also facing 
similar demand functions, and how a manufacturer would coordinate the channels. 
 
Capacity and State effect 
 The parameter δ  depicts the effect of increasing AP  on 0q  and increasing 0P  on Aq . The 
assumption δβ >  means that the effect of increasing 0P ( AP ) on 0q ( Aq ) is larger than the effect 
of the same increase in AP ( 0P ) i.e. own time-price effect dominates the cross-time price effect. 
This is a reasonable assumption because the price of a service is more sensitive to a change in the 
quantity at its own time than one across time.  This could be due to several reasons: for instance, 
the services could be differentiated by time, which may create other uncertainties for the buyers 
and thereby result in a lower cross-time effect. 
 Note that the parameter δ , in the context of advance selling of services, can be deemed to 
partially characterize buyers’ valuation and acquisition risks. This means that a change in spot 
price would have an impact on advance demand, and the degree of impact is dependent on the 
magnitude of δ . It is assumed, for convenience, that the demand functions are symmetric across 
time. This assumption will be relaxed later. Thus, if the acquisition and valuation risks are low, 
δ may increase, implying that there is increased substitutability between buying in advance and at 
spot. 
 The probability that a buyer who buys in advance, but is unable to consume, is 
parameterized as ρ  where 10 << ρ . Note that the portion of demand sold in advance that is 
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unable to be consumed at 0t  can be equivalently depicted as Aqρ . This capacity could be re-sold to 
buyers at spot, and at the spot price of 0P , yielding a revenue of AqP ρ0  (the assumption of the firm 
possessing full ability to re-sell relinquished capacity will be relaxed later in the study). Finally, the 
firm may be constrained by its overall capacity i.e. Kqq A ≤+0 .  
 Given the situation described above, the objective function of the service firm becomes: 
][
0,
πpp AMax   where AAA qPqPqP ρπ 000 ++=  for the unconstrained firm 
and where Kqq A ≤+0  for the constrained firm 
The following are the model assumptions:  
• While the study models the proportion of non-consuming buyers, it is assumed that this 
proportion, together with the consumer demand parameters, is common knowledge to the 
firm and the market i.e. there is perfect information. 
• The marginal cost of providing the service is negligible, as service firms in general operate 
with high fixed costs. This is consistent with research in this area (e.g. Kimes, 1989; 
Desiraju and Shugan, 1999).  
• The capacity has no salvage value after production/consumption. 
• The service under study is a pure service (with no attributes of a good), so the consumer, 
after consumption, has no ownership of anything tangible.  
• The firm will only sell if prices at spot and in advance are positive i.e. 0, 0 >PPA .  
• The firm can credibly commit to spot prices in advance (cf. Xie and Shugan, 2001) 
• Buyers who buy in advance are guaranteed the availability of capacity at the time of 
consumption. As buyers are represented within demand functions, they are assumed to be 
heterogeneous (in terms of risk aversion and their preferences). 
• Capacity relinquished by advance buyers can be fully re-sold at spot (this assumption is 
relaxed in the next section). 
• The service is not transferable. 
• The firm is a monopoly.  
 Furthermore, the model assumes a high congruence between what the seller sells and what 
the buyers believe they are buying. For example, a movie, a flight, a hotel room, a tow truck 
service, an annual auditing service can all be considered (almost) homogeneous units of services 
because what the buyer expects to consume is similar to what the seller expects to produce. Whilst 
it is acknowledged that services are heterogeneous, the heterogeneity is usually at the point of 
consumption and it is assumed that the degree of service heterogeneity expected by prospective 
buyers do not sufficiently influence the value they place on the service in advance of consumption. 
Hence, the heterogeneity in demand lies only in buyers’ valuation of the service and not because of 
perceived differences in the service offering. 
 A few noteworthy comments on the firm’s objective function are necessary at this juncture. 
First, it is assumed that by having perfect information, the firm maximizes its profit at one stage, 
despite the profit being derived across two times i.e. advance and spot. Since all parameters of 
demand at both times are common knowledge to the firm, it would be strategic in maximizing and 
manipulating its prices for both times. Certainly if information is not perfect, the model could be 
modeled in a variety of ways e.g. with two stages of strategic pricing through backward induction, 
or with myopic pricing where the firm maximizes profit in advance and then at spot (cf. Jagpal, 
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1998). The purpose here is to understand the phenomenon in its idealized form, without setting 
specific conditions. 
 The Xie-Shugan model depicts the phenomenon as a two-period process where 
homogeneous consumers arriving in period 1 can decide to buy or wait till after the firm announces 
their spot and advance prices. Consumers may also arrive in period 2. In reality, buyers are not 
merely heterogeneous in their valuation of the service (i.e. own-time price sensitivity). They are 
also heterogeneous in their willingness to switch between spot and advance time (cross-time 
sensitivity).  
 In Png’s model, the advance buyer, should he choose to buy, knows how much he values 
the service only at the time of consumption. The probability of the buyer turning out to be a low or 
high valuation customer is depicted as λ  (in Xie-Shugan, it is q). This model incorporates this 
feature with ρ . A buyer is deemed to have a high valuation if he is able to consume, and a low 
valuation if he is unable to do so. However, a key difference is that Png assumes a low valuation 
customer is such, regardless of his ability to consume. Although this may not make a difference to 
the customer, his willingness to consume has a direct effect on the firm. If he does not consume, 
the capacity can be relinquished and re-sold. This ability to re-sell obviously impacts on the price 
of the service, both in advance and at spot. This ability had not been considered in all previous 
models, and this study has incorporated it here. 
ANALYSES 
 For the unconstrained firm, the study provides the following lemma as a benchmark: 
Lemma 1: When 0=ρ  and the capacity constraint is non-binding, 
)(2
*
0
*
δβ
α
−== PPA  which we 
denote as )0(*P , and 
2
*
0
* α== qqA  which we denote as )0(*q and )(2
2
*
δβ
απ −=  which we 
denote as )0(*π . 
 If the fraction of non-consumption capacity is zero 0=ρ , i.e. all advance buyers are able 
to consume, prices and quantities sold at 0t  and At  will be the same, due to the symmetric demand 
functions. This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
<< Take in Figure 1>> 
 Since ρ  will always take on a positive value, prices and quantities at 0t  and At  start 
diverging, as the following proposition shows: 
Proposition 1:  When 0>ρ , the firm derives a higher profit by lowering advance price and 
increasing spot price such that  [ ]( ))2()(21)0(** δβρδβ −+−⋅−= SPPA  [ ]( )ρβδβ +−⋅+= )(21)0(**0 SPP  
and obtains a higher advance demand but lower spot demand such that 
                         [ ]( )ρβδβ ++⋅+= )(21)0(** SqqA  [ ]( ))2()(21)0(**0 δβρδβ +++⋅−= Sqq  
 where 
)])(4 2222 ρβδβ
βρ
−−=S   and 0,
*
0
* >PPA  if and only if 24
2
ρδβ −⋅> . 
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 As every unit of advance demand provides an opportunity for the firm to re-sell, the firm 
chooses to lower *AP  to obtain a higher advance demand. Due to cross-time sensitivity, a lower 
*
AP  
decreases spot demand. However, instead of compensating by lowering *0P  to obtain higher spot 
demand, the firm chooses to increase *0P  instead, since re-selling capacity can be done at a 
premium, and the marginal revenue from doing so (through a higher *0P ) is higher than marginal 
revenue derived from increasing spot demand through a lower *0P . A graphical representation of 
the above can be seen in Figure 1. Notice that the solutions are conditional on
)4(
2
2ρδβ −⋅> . 
This means that the ability of a firm to obtain positive revenue from selling in advance is 
dependent on the degree of own-time price sensitivity vis-à-vis cross-time price sensitivity. Notice 
that S  exists only when 0>ρ . Thus, while the terms proceeding S  determine the level of 
increase or decrease in prices and quantities, we can intuitively label S  as the non-consumption 
effect attributable to the advance purchase of services. 
 To highlight the impact on profit, the difference in expected profits (after some 
manipulation) can be written as 
Lemma 2:  
)5()4()3()2()1()0(** −+++=−ππ   
where (1) [ ]βρδβρρ +−⋅ )(2)0()0()2()0()0( **** SqPqP  (2) [ ]βρδβρ +−⋅ )(2)0()0( ** SqP  
(3) [ ]βρδβρ ++⋅ )(2)0()0( ** SqP  (4) [ ][ ]βρδββρδβρ +−++⋅ )(2)(2)0()0( 2** SqP  (5) [ ]ρδρβρβδβ 2222222** 44)(4)0()0(2 −++−⋅SqP  
 The first term is the added profit due to double-selling the fraction of non-consuming 
capacity, )0(qρ . The second shows that the capacity is double-sold with a price premium of 
[ ]βρδβ +−⋅ )(2S . The third term shows that the advance demand also increases, amplified by the 
combination of both own-time and cross-time sensitivities i.e. [ ]βρδβ ++⋅ )(2S . This 
amplification is due to advance demand being made higher through both a higher spot price and a 
lower advance price. The fourth term shows that the increase in advance demand also enjoys the 
same price premium. Finally, the fifth term captures the loss in revenue as a result of a lower 
advance price and a lower spot demand.  
 Lemma 1 is consistent with Xie-Shugan’s model where it was shown that when marginal 
cost is low and capacity constraint is non-binding, advance and spot prices are the same. However, 
the findings here also show that advance prices may be lower even when marginal costs are zero, 
as the presence of ρ  creates the divergence in advance and spot prices. Clearly, the potential 
revenue from one unit of advance sale is higher than that from spot sale. Therefore, advance price 
decreases to generate a higher advance demand. The cross-time effect of this is an even higher spot 
price. 
 As ρ  increases, the firm has a greater incentive to price AP  lower to stimulate advance 
demand. This amplifies the decrease in spot demand, pushing 0P  even higher. 
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Proposition 2:  The greater the probability of non-consumption, the higher (lower) the quantity 
sold in advance (at spot) and the lower (higher) the advance (spot) price i.e. 0
*
<∂
∂
ρ
AP , 0
*
0 >∂
∂
ρ
P
 
and >∂
∂
ρ
*
Aq , 0
*
0 <∂
∂
ρ
q , and the higher the profit. 
 In Png’s model, a strategy of selling firm advance orders does not maximize profit because 
the advance buyer is unwilling to pay a higher price due to acquisition and valuation risks. Yet, a 
firm advance order usually guarantees availability and as the Xie-Shugan model has shown, firm 
advance orders can be optimal.   
 By modeling in non-consumption – and taking into account the fact that a buyer who 
purchases in advance has a non-zero probability of not consuming and that non-consumption frees 
up the capacity to be re-sold -- this study shows that the potential revenue from advance sales 
increases and that it may be optimal for the firm to sell in advance. 
 Png’s model showed that the seller’s revenue from spot sales is zero because buyers would 
prefer the non-contingent alternative in advance rather than wait till spot where the seller would 
extract all the consumer’s surplus (i.e. high price). Where the market is heterogeneous in the form 
of a demand function, the optimal price at spot assumes not all surpluses are extracted from 
everyone. Consequently, there is also heterogeneity in the degree to which customers may be 
willing to wait till spot or buy in advance. This implies that both spot and advance demand would 
exist, with some degree of substitutability between buying at these two times, as modeled here. 
Accordingly, there is an optimal price at both times, as set out above in proposition 1. 
 Figure 1 also shows the same formulation, but with the firm constrained by capacity. 
Capacity constraint serves to push up advance and spot prices but reduce quantities in advance and 
at spot, with the result of a lower profit. 
Proposition 3:  INTERMEDIATE CAPACITY  
 If the firm is constrained in capacity but the capacity is such that 
δβ
δβα
β
δβα
2
)(3)(
+
+<<+ K , the firm does not sell in advance when 1≤≤′ ρρ  AND 
δβ
δβα
2
)(3
+
+<K  whereby 
)(
))(2(2
δβαβ
δβαρ +−
+−=′
K
K   (NO ADVANCE SALE) 
Proposition 4: LOW CAPACITY  
 If the firm is constrained in capacity such that β
δβα )( +<K , the firm does not sell in 
advance nor at spot when 10 ≤≤′′≤′≤ ρρρ  whereby 
)()2(
)(2
δβαδβ
δβρ ++−
−=′′
K
K   (MARKET 
FAILURE) 
 Proposition 3 lays out the scenario for many services where the valuation risk (and 
therefore the non-consumption probability) is high and there is no positive price that would induce 
a buyer to buy in advance. Advance price is zero, and the firm will not sell in advance. This 
scenario also happens in the unconstrained case, although only at values of ρ  higher than in the 
constrained case, since the constraint increases prices and lowers quantities, thereby resulting in 0q  
hitting the boundary faster with increasing ρ . This seems the case for many services that face high 
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valuation risks e.g. legal services, where buyers will only value the service at the time the need 
arises. Such services may therefore find no advance buyers. 
 Proposition 4 lays out the values of ρ  where the firm isn’t willing to sell in advance 
because the price is too low (i.e. 0=AP ) and there are no buyers at spot either, because the spot 
demand is too low (i.e. 00 =q ) for the firm’s price. This scenario of the firm’s refusal to sell in 
advance and the market’s refusal to buy at spot essentially demonstrates market failure. The 
propositions are diagrammatically depicted in Figure 2. 
<< Take in Figure 2>> 
MODEL EXTENSION: OFFERING A REFUND 
 Providing refunds for the buyer’s inability to consume is widely practiced in the airline 
industry. Casual enquiries made by the author with airlines sales offices indicate that many airline 
tickets are sold with some refund value. Some airlines even provide a full refund, i.e. the purchased 
ticket can be returned to the airline for a complete reimbursement of the price at any time – even 
after the proposed travel date. This means that if the buyer cannot make a flight for any reason, the 
airline is fully prepared to return the price of the air ticket to the customer without any penalty fee, 
no questions asked. Furthermore, many airlines allow a refund on non-utilized sectors, e.g. if the 
consumer purchased a return ticket but only utilized one leg of the ticket. 
  According to Ng (2008), there is a fundamental difference between a full refund of this 
nature and those given out by retail shops for goods purchased or by service firms after the 
consumption of the service. In the latter, the refund is given (or promised) due to firm’s failure; ie 
if the buyer perceives that the firm has failed to deliver the benefits. In the former -- and also the 
focal point of this study -- refunds are promised for buyer failure i.e. when the buyer fails to 
consume the service, through no fault of the firm. The use of the term ‘buyer failure’ is chosen for 
ease of explanation and is entirely from the firm’s perspective; a firm’s guarantee of capacity when 
selling in advance is usually in return for the buyer’s guarantee to consume and if the buyer doesn’t 
do so, he is deemed to have ‘failed’. Buyers however, could argue that they have a right to demand 
for a refund since they have yet to consume the service. What this study aims to investigate, by 
extending the current model, is whether there is any benefit to the firm, revenue-wise, if it had to 
provide that refund.  
 Consequently, this study extends the model to investigate the circumstances where the firm 
may have to provide a refund, r, as a fraction of the advance price. The firm can be compelled to 
provide r due to reasons such as competition. It is assumed that there is a speculative market at At , 
such that it prohibits the firm from providing any refund above a full refund i.e. 10 ≤< r . In 
addition, the offer of a refund expands advance demand, as this reduces valuation risk. 
.  Definitions: 
RAP , ( RP ,0 ) =  Price per unit of the service sold at advance time (spot), with a full refund offer  
Rπ  = Profit to the service firm when a refund is offered to advance buyers 
RAq , ( Rq ,0 )= Quantity of service demanded by the market at advance time (spot) 
r  = Refund offered by the firm where 10 ≤< r   γ  = Advance demand shifting parameter due to refund offered.  
 The objective function is now })1{( 000
,
max
0
AAA
PP
qPqPqPr
A
ρρ ++−  
subject to the system of demand  and  
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We have the following constraints on probability of not consuming, ρ, and on the amount of 
refund, r which is  and  and also constraint on non-negativity of quantity of 
capacity sold, and the constraint that the number of customers who finally consume the service 
(whether they purchased in advance or at spot) does not exceed the capacity of the service firm i.e. 
 
 The resultant formulation for optimal refund cannot be described in a closed form, and is 
complex and not tractable. To understand optimal refund, the limiting cases cannot be seen from 
the formulae. Figure 3 shows the results from numerical analysis where each plot is for various 
values of ρ . Then for every demand-shifting factor,γ , there is an optimal value of refund, r, such 
that profit achieves maximum.  
<< Take in Figure 3>> 
 In order to understand Figure 3, suppose ρ is small (Figure 3: (2) or (3)). Then, if γ  is 
small, the demand Aq  is not sensitive to refund; the optimal refund is zero. If demand Aq  is very 
sensitive to refund, then it is optimal to give a complete refund. It is clear that if the probability of 
not consuming is close to zero, the firm can then give a full refund even when Aq  is not very 
sensitive to refund (Figure (3): (1)). Note that if probability ρ  is not very large and if γ  is large, 
then it is optimal to give a full refund.  
 Suppose ρ is close to one (above a certain threshold); basically almost everyone who buys 
in advance does not consume. Suppose the demand is sensitive to refund (γ >0). In this case, 
although it is not optimal to give a full refund, a refund offer is still made and the optimal refund 
falls with increasing probability ρ  ((4), (5) and (6)). This optimal refund does not depend onγ . 
This is, however, misleading as at high values of ρ , advance price hits the boundary (i.e. )0* =AP  
as seen in Figure 4 which shows the effect of refund on optimal prices, quantities and profits, 
thereby resulting in the firm not selling in advance at all.  
<< Take in Figure 4>> 
 The intuition is as follows. First, at low values of ρ  andγ , a full refund is optimal because 
the cost of providing it is low. However, as ρ  increases while demand shiftγ  is constant (i.e. at 
X), optimal refund reduces as providing refunds become more costly. Since a refund offer 
increases advance demand and price as well as spot price (Figure 4), a refund offer may still be 
optimal even when the probability of not consuming is intermediately high (e.g. 0.6). Clearly, there 
is a balance between the benefit of higher demand and the cost of providing the refunds. Since the 
analysis is numerical, general conclusions are not possible. 
  Proposition 5:  There exists a scenario where 1>ρ , 1>γ , and the firm sells both in 
advance and at spot i.e. 0, ** >AA qP  and 0, *0*0 >qP and the firm’s profit is higher through advance 
prices and quantities and higher spot price (Figure 3) by (a) Providing no refund (X1) (b) 
Providing a positive refund such that 10 << r (X2) (c) Providing a full refund that is optimal (X3) 
 Xie-Shugan showed that firm advance orders with a refund offer may be optimal, as the 
firm is able to obtain a higher price in advance to compensate for the cost of refund, as well as 
derive greater profits from cost savings in not having to serve these customers.  
 The above proposition shows that the firm could derive higher revenue from higher prices, 
higher advance demand as well as higher spot prices when a refund is offered. This means that the 
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insurance from non-consumption is partially paid by an increase in advance price and partially 
borne by the expansion in advance demand.  
DISCUSSION 
 This study aims to offer a more applicable model of advance selling as a phenomenon. The 
theoretical model incorporated consumer price sensitivity, degree of cross-time substitutability, as 
well as the ability of the service firm to re-sell relinquished capacity at spot time to derive the 
optimal prices and quantities.  
 In proposition 1, the model found that advance prices are lower than spot prices even 
without binding capacity constraints or marginal costs, because the potential revenue from one unit 
of advance sale is higher than that from spot sale. Proposition 2 showed that as the probability of 
non-consumption increased, advance prices decreased while spot prices increased further. 
 Proposition 3 showed the conditions under which services are not able to sell in advance, 
where very low prices and capacity constraints mean only spot sales is optimal. Incidentally, 
emergency services would most likely fall into this category. Proposition 4 showed that market 
failure could occur when the firm refuses to sell in advance and there are no buyers at spot. This 
scenario could possibly illustrate the extreme case of selling a service where both acquisition and 
valuation risks (Ng, 2007) are high. 
 Proposition 5 showed that providing a refund could be optimal, resulting in increased 
advance prices and quantities, and with an effect on spot price. This proposition demonstrates the 
pareto optimality of such practices by service firms like airlines, where the offer of a refund is 
insurance against non-consumption for the buyer, but for the seller, the refund is funded in part by 
expanded demand and not merely by an increase in price, thus benefiting both buyers and seller.  
 The model can also be applied onto revenue management through a non-linear 
programming approach, where the firm can obtain the optimal price and quantity sold at each 
(continuous) point in time as: 
⎩⎨
⎧
⎭⎬
⎫≤= ∫0* )(max nPt KdttqArgP t π  for }...2,1,0{ nt ∈  and *0** )()()( PtPttq tt δβα +−=  
Where: 0)()()( PtPttq tt δβα +−=  and ∫+−= 0 000 )()0()0( n t dtPtPq δβα  and 
∫∫ += 000 ),(),( n tttn ttt dttPqPdttPqP ρπ  
 Essentially, the firm faces a demand function at any point in advance that incorporates 
some degree of substitutability between the price at that time and the 0t  price. Each demand 
parameter is time dependent, and the distribution of that parameter across time may be defined 
exogenously. The optimal price and quantity to be sold is generated from the objective function 
that multiples the quantity sold at each time with the price at that time, cumulative across time. 
Each advance time will also yield a fraction that may not be consumed at 0t  and that is accounted 
for in the objective function. Hence, the price and quantity relationship is captured explicitly, as is 
the substitutability between times of purchase. By using the demand function, a vast quantity of 
economic literature can be applied to the advance selling context to produce richer insights into the 
strategy of advance selling. 
 In the past, where pricing is often static, the above specification might have been difficult 
to implement. However, with the advent of the connected economy, where data can be obtained 
quickly, technological innovations have made complicated algorithms possible to implement. 
Thus, a dynamic pricing model such as the one suggested above is not impossible.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The study shows that without the possibility of influencing demand, services could end up 
with a service that has high state dependency, hence making it difficult for a firm to sell in 
advance. In the extreme case where a service has high state dependency characteristics and at the 
same time is not easily available, market failure occurs as the firm is unable to sell at all. 
 Our model also contributes to extant literature by demonstrating that when heterogeneous 
demand behavior is explicitly modeled with non-consumption and refunds, firms would then able 
to understand where and how service revenue is being obtained (higher price or higher demand) 
and the impact of various sensitivities on revenue. The impact of capacity on the parameters 
modeled would also provide insight that could inform capacity investment decisions. Finally, as 
the model has demonstrated, the offer of refunds can increase profit for the firm. However, firms 
may interpret refunds as a form of costly differentiation and be tempted to drop the offer (as some 
low-cost airlines do). In doing so, they miss the opportunity to derive higher profits either through 
expanded advance demand or through higher advance prices. 
 It is unfortunate that the model extension is not mathematically tractable and therefore did 
not lend itself towards a closed form solution. Yet, we maintain that there is sufficient contribution 
from the results in propositions 1-4 and for the numerical scenarios presented in proposition 5 to 
warrant attention. The issue of services pricing has long been under-researched, and as service 
economies mature and become more competitive, it also becomes increasingly important. 
 The current study does not consider uncertainty in the spot price. Bringing in uncertainty 
could also allow for an investigation of a two-stage model that could be solved through backward 
induction. Further research can explore this as well as the costs of advance selling and the impact 
of competition on advance selling strategies. In addition, the limitation of the model which 
assumes a one-stage optimization could be relaxed into a multi-stage game where the service 
provider can change the spot prices after the advance demand has been realized. Finally, it would 
also be of use to investigate the case where the firm is not a monopoly. By abstracting the 
phenomenon of advance pricing in services through a stylized model, the study aims to provide a 
platform for a more thorough understanding of pricing in services across various service industries 
and the strategic levers to improve revenues. 
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Figure 1: Characterization of the Non-consumption effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The effect of capacity on advance and spot selling 
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Figure 3: Effect of refund on prices and quantities 
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Figure 4: Optimal Refund with changing γ and ρ  
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APPENDIX (PROOFS) 
Lemma 1:  
(1)     0PPq AA δβα +−=  
(2)     APPq δβα +−= 00  
and AAA qPqPqP ρπ 000 ++=  
}{
0,
πPPAMax  and solving for (1) and (2) results in 
  222
*
0 )(4
))2(2(
βρδβ
ρβδα
−−
++=P   ; 222
2
*
)(4
))2(2(
βρδβ
ρρβδα
−−
−−+=AP  
Substituting back to the demand functions will lead to 
  222
222
*
0 )(4
)1(2)2([
βρδβ
ρβδρδρρβα
−−
+−−−−=q ;   222* )(4
)2)2()((
βρδβ
δρβδβα
−−
−++=Aq  
Thus when 0=ρ , the above yields 
)(2
)0(**0
*
δβ
α
−=== PPPA , 2)0(
**
0
* α=== qqqA  and )(2)0(
2
*
δβ
απ −=  
 
Proposition 1: 
From the above proof of lemma 1  
** )0( APP −  results in ))]2()(2(1)[0(** δβρδβ −+−−=⇒ SPPA                   
0(**0 PP −  results in )])(2(1)[0(**0 βρδβ +−+=⇒ SPP  
*
0
* )0( qq −  results in ))]2()(2(1)[0(**0 δβρδβ +++−=⇒ Sqq                         
 )0(** qqA −  results in )])(2(1)[0(** βρδβ +++=⇒ SqqA     
Where  222 )(4 βρδβ
βρ
−−=S and 0>S  if and only if )4(
2
2ρδβ −⋅>  and 1)4(
2
2
>− ρ  QED 
Lemma 2: 
From lemma 1 above, the optimal profit of the firm would be: 
**
0
*
0
*
0
***
AAA qPqPqP ρπ ++=  
Replace the results of proposition 1 above (i.e. (9) – (12)) obtain the lemma after re-arranging (QED) 
 
Proposition 2: 
2222
232
))(4(
)]4(44
βρδβ
ρββδ
ρ −−
++−=∂
∂S
 and 0>∂
∂
ρ
S
if 
24
2
ρδβ +⋅> which is true since δβ > and 
1
4
2
2
<+ ρ . Hence,  
0)2)(0()2()0())(0(2 ***
*
<−−−∂
∂−−∂
∂−=∂
∂ δβδβρρδβρρ SPP
SPSPA , 
0)0()0())(0(2 ***
*
0 >+∂
∂+−∂
∂=∂
∂ βρβρδβρρ SPP
SPSP , 
0)2)(0()2()0())(0(2 ***
*
0 <+−+∂
∂−+∂
∂−=∂
∂ δβδβρρδβρρ Sqq
SqSq  
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0)0()0())(0(2 ***
*
>+∂
∂++∂
∂=∂
∂ βρβρδβρρ Sqq
SqSqA  
 
Capacity Constraint and Refund Solution 
It is convenient to solve the problem in quantities space, as all constraints are put on quantities. We can 
solve the demand system with respect to prices: 
(13) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 02 2 2 2 2 2
02 2 2 2 2 2
A
A A
r
P q q
r
P q q
β δ α δγ β δ
β δ β δ β δ
β δ α βγ δ β
β δ β δ β δ
+ += − −− − −
+ += − −− − −
 
Note that if β>δ as originally set, then intercept is always positive (provided that α>0). If we try to solve the 
problem for β>δ we need to calibrate α<0.  Having inverted the system of demand, we can substitute prices 
as functions of quantities into the profit function to obtain: 
 
(14) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
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0
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0 02 2 2 2 2 2
2
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r
r q q q
r
q q q q
r rr
q q q
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q q q
β δ α βγ δ βρ β δ β δ β δ
β δ α δγ β δ ρβ δ β δ β δ
ρ ρ γβ β δ αγδ β δ α β
β δ β δ β δ
ρ β ρδ ρδ ρβ δ
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0
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0
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A
q q K
q K
q K
+ ≤
≤ ≤
≤ ≤
 
    Note that we obtained a quadratic function with negative coefficients on q²0 and  q²A. 
    Note that we now maximize profit with respect to quantities. 
These inequalities define us a triangular area in coordinates (q0 , qA). 
3. If we want interpretation we can say that we are looking for a maximum of a paraboloid (think of an 
upside down bowl) underneath the triangular area. The maximum can be achieved either below the 
triangular area, in this case constraints are not binding, or outside. In the latter case, the maximum will be 
achieved on one of the boundaries of the triangular area, or in its vertexes. 
4. This is what our algorithm does. We first find unconstrained maximum, then check if constraints are 
binding, and if they are, we look at the relevant constraint. Because all functions are quadratic, it is 
straightforward to do so. 
5. The collection of formulae. 
Unconstrained maximum is achieved at (partial derivatives of profit are zeros): 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
02 2 2 2 2 2
02 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2
0 2
2
0 2
A
A
r r r r
q q
r r
q q
ρ ρ γβ β δ α ρ β ρδ ρδ ρβ δ
β δ β δ β δ
γδ β δ α ρδ ρβ δβ
β δ β δ β δ
+ − + + − + − −= − +− − −
+ + − −= − +− − −
 
from where: 
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(15) 
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if capacity constraint is binding then: 
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if non-negativity (q0=0) constraint is binding: 
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if non-negativity ( q_{A}=0) constraint is binding: 
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and the profit is: 
(20) ( )* * * * * * *0 0 01 A A Ar P q P q P qπ ρ ρ= − + +  
 
The zero refund case (proposition 3 and 4) 
Suppose there is no capacity constraint. K is much greater than α . Then optimal quantities are determined 
by: 
(21) 
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Optimal prices are determined as:  
(22) 
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Suppose there is a capacity constraint. Then optimal quantities are determined by: 
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As ρ  approaches one, *AP  approaches negative values. Hence, when 0* ≤AP , which is when ρρ ′≤  
whereby 
)(
))(2(2
δβαβ
δβαρ +−
+−=′
K
K
 and 1<′ρ  when δβ
δβα
2
)(3
+
+<K  therefore 
 
No advance sale when: 
(24) 0* =AP  when 1≤≤′ ρρ  AND δβ
δβα
2
)(3
+
+<K  
 
Similarly, it is clear from the graphs in Figure 1 that if ρ  approaches one, q0 becomes negative. The non-
negativity constraint becomes binding i.e. when 0*0 ≤q , ρρ ′′>  whereby )()2(
)(2
δβαδβ
δβρ ++−
−=′′
K
K
 
and 1<′′ρ  when β
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No Spot sale when: 
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Hence, when:  
ρρ ′′<′  if and only if: 
 
δ
δβα )( +<K  and, β
δβα )( +<K  and δβ
δβα
2
)(
−
+<K  which are all true when β
δβα )( +<K  from 
(24) above. 
Clearly, from (24) and (25), market failure occurs when 10 ≤≤′′≤ ρρ  
 
However, at intermediate capacity of δβ
δβα
β
δβα
2
)(3)(
+
+<<+ K , market failure does not occur 
although the firm is only able to sell in advance when 10 ≤≤′≤ ρρ  
 
Proposition 5  
 
This proposition is illustrated numerically from Figure 3 and 4, obtained by entering the following values 
into the formulae in (15) – (23) above: 
 
50=α , 10=β , 1.0=δ , 16=γ , 5.0=r (in the case where a refund is offered), 40=K  for the 
constrained firm, 100=K  for the unconstrained firm 
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